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Sacrificing the Whole Truth: Florida's Deteriorating
Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence in Cases of
Child Sexual Abuse
David M De La Paz

INTRODUCTION

One of the cornerstones of our system ofjustice is that it is better
to let the guilty go free than to convict an innocent man or woman. That
fundamental principle, however, comes with a price. Consider the cost
of a "safeguard," intended to avoid convicting an innocent person that,
while being effective at letting the guilty go free, actually accomplishes
nothing toward avoiding conviction of an innocent person. Such a
"safeguard" has developed in Floridawith regard to the admissibility of
evidence of a defendant's other child sex crimes in cases of child sexual
abuse. For future victims, the price of letting a guilty child molester go
free is very high. Some child molesters have several hundred or even a
thousand victims over the course of a lifetime.'
Under section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, evidence of
other crimes - often called "similar fact" evidence - is admissible in
all other types of criminal cases when it is relevant to a fact in issue, and
not solely relevant to show the defendant's propensity to commit a crime
like the one charged. In recent years, Florida's courts have grafted on
more stringent rules for admitting similar fact evidence in cases of child
sexual abuse.2 As a result, the use of such evidence in these cases has
been substantially restricted.
Many cases of child sexual abuse are very difficult for
prosecutors to prove because the crime consisted of lewd fondling, digital
penetration, or the child being forced to perform sex acts upon the
assailant, and there is no physical evidence left by the commission of the
crime. Frequently, these are crimes of opportunity, taking place when the
child is alone with the assailant. In such cases, the child's testimony is
the only evidence of the crime, and the child's credibility becomes the
1KENITH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS INVESTIGATING CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 15 (3d ed.
1992) (available from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children).
2See infra notes 36-79 and accompanying text.

449

450

N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. Rts.

[Vol. XV

pivotal factor in the case.
Much of the difficulty connected with these cases is the
calculated result of child molesters who carefully select their victims and
opportunities. In defense of criminal charges, child molesters can
effectively raise doubts in the minds ofjurors by simply alleging that the
child victim is lying or that the child's testimony is the product of
improper influence. Some of the difficulty is inherent within the context
of how the allegations arise, such as when a charge is made against a
parent, and a dispute over child custody is involved. In either instance,
jurors trying to weigh the credibility of a young child have an extremely
difficult task.
In cases such as these, similar fact evidence 3 can be a powerful
tool to assist juries in weighing the credibility of child victims. As a
practical matter, innocent people don't have prior victims. What are the
odds that a young child would falsely or mistakenly accuse a child
molester of committing the same type of crime that he has a chronic
tendency to commit? On the other hand, consider the motivations of a
repeated child molester to perjure himself on the witness stand and
accuse the victim of raising false accusations. It is one thing to judge the
veracity of a single child's testimony against the adamant denials of the
accused. It is entirely different, however, when two, three, or more
children testify to other times when the accused has molested them as
well. The knowledge that a defendant has sexually assaulted other
children can be the deciding factor in the mind of a juror on whether to
believe or disbelieve the testimony of a child victim.
This article will examine how far the rule of admissibility on
"similar fact" evidence has departed from the original intent ofWilliams
4 theFlorida Supreme Court case which articulated the
v. State of Florida,
rule for the admission of similar fact evidence. In addition, this article
will examine the Florida Supreme Court (hereinafter "Supreme Court")
cases that developed the current, more stringent, standard to admit similar
fact evidence in child sexual abuse cases. Finally, considerations in
defining a rule of admissibility that can be more consistently applied in
' As used in this article the terms "similar fact evidence," "collateral crime
evidence" and "Williams rule evidence" will be used interchangeably.
' 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
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this highly sensitive area of law will be explored.

I. DEFINING THE STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF SIMILAR FACT
EVIDENCE IN FLORIDA

A. A HistoricalOverview
5 the Supreme
In the seminal case of Williams v. State of Florida,
Court announced the rule of admissibility of so-called similar fact
evidence. 6 Before discussing the Williams case itself, however, it is
necessary to describe the historical context of the issue at the time it came
before the Supreme Court.
In the late Nineteenth Century, the rule of admitting similar fact
evidence was transplanted from England to Florida.7 This rule was a
broad rule of admissibility which allowed all relevant evidence to be
introduced unless it related only to the defendant's bad character or
propensity.' It was subject to only a few specific exceptions.' As the
rule was applied to Florida cases over time, the Court began expressing
the rule in terms of exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion, rather than in
terms of a broad rule of admissibility.' ° When the Court addressed the
issue in Williams, there was considerable confusion and divergence of
opinion over the rule of admissibility that had developed in Florida."

Id.
6 Professor Charles Ehrhardt points out: "Thus it can be misleading to refer to

this evidence as 'similar fact' evidence because similarity of the facts involved in the
collateral act or crime does not insure relevance for admissibility. Similarly, evidence of
collateral crimes may be relevant and admissible even if it is not similar." CHARLES
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE, § 404.09, at 167 (1998).
Williams, 110 So.2d at 659.
I/d. at 659.
91d.
10

Id.
IIId. at 658.
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B. A Perspective on Analyzing Admissibility
At the time Williams was decided, there were two law review
articles that had been written by a widely cited authority, Professor Julius
Stone, that analyzed the historical development of the English and
American rules on admissibility of similar fact evidence132 Both of these
articles were favorably noted in the Williams opinion.
Professor Stone identified a conflict between the development of
two approaches to admitting similar fact evidence. 4 Under the first
approach, which he termed the "original rule," the only similar fact
evidence excluded was that which was only relevant to show the
defendant's propensity and nothing else. 5 Under this approach, the
proper inquiry for the Court to determine admissibility was: "Is this
evidence in any way relevant to a fact in issue otherwise than by merely
showing propensity?"' 6 The second approach, which Stone called the
"spurious rule," is described as a broad rule excluding evidence of all
other bad acts, unless the evidence falls within a listed exception.17 The
inquiry for a court applying the spurious rule is: "Does this evidence fall
within any exception to the rule of exclusion?"'"
Stone's view was that the spurious rule was more difficult to
apply, and more uncertain than the original rule. 9 The following
crystallizes the contrast between the two rules:
The original rule admits evidence relevant to any of the
innumerable issues which can arise out of the infinitely
variable circumstances of men's behavior. The spurious
12See Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England,

46 Harv. L. Rev. 954(1933); Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence:
America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988 (1938).
1"Williams, 110 So.2d at 659.
14Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARv. L. REv. 988, at 989, 1004-1008 (1938).
5 According to Stone, this rule was the original English rule as well as original
American rule. Id. at 1004.
16id.
7

1d. at 1005.

19Id.
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rule only admits relevant evidence when it is within one
of the list of exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.
If not within those categories it is inadmissible however
relevant it be, for it is caught by the residual rule
excluding all evidence of other offenses. A court which
is applying the spurious rule will exclude evidence
clearly, even overwhelmingly, relevant to an issue other
than propensity, because it finds difficulty in fitting the
case into the rigid category.2"
In other words, without a thorough list of exceptions to cover
every conceivable issue that may be relevant, other than propensity, it is
possible to have evidence excluded under the spurious rule that would
have been admitted under the original rule.2'
C. Williams v. State of Florida
The Williams case was an opportunity for the Court to, in its own
words: "analyze the rule and in the ultimate reviveoriginalprecedents
so that in the future the correct rule of evidence may be applied in its
proper setting."22 The passage below makes it clear that the Court was
turning away from its past tendency of announcing the rule in terms of
exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion, (the spurious rule approach) and
adopting a broad rule of admissibility (the original rule approach):
Our own cases over the past fifty years have tended to
convert the original rule of admissibility into a rule of
exclusion with innumerable exceptions. We thereby
have allowed relevant evidence as an "exception" to a
broad rule excluding all other evidence.
The result simply is thatonce again the exceptions have
become the rule. In actuality we are merely applying the
basic canon of relevancy in each particular case in order
Stone, supra note 14, at 1006.
Id. at 1007.
22 Williams, 110 So.2d at 658 (emphasis added).
20
'
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to determine whether certain specific evidence is or is
not admissible. Otherwise stated, if the evidence appears
to be relevant to a material fact in issue, we have
customarily found an exception with which to clothe it
with admissibility. On the other hand, if the collateral
similar fact evidence lacks relevancy to a fact in issue,
we have come to announce that such evidence is not
admissible, there being no exception within which it
could fall in order to make it relevant. The objectionable
feature of this approach is that seemingly the
fundamentalprincipleof logicalrelevancy is abandoned
In its place is substituted a search for an exception under
which the evidence becomes admissible, but which will
be discovered only if out of the infinite variety of human
activities a case has arisen in which some court had held
it so."

Turning now to the specifics of the Williams case, the defendant
was convicted of raping a 17-year-old girl. Williams hid in the back seat
of the victim's car while she was shopping. After the victim returned to
her car and drove a short distance, the defendant reached over the seat,
stabbed her in the chest with an ice pick, leaped into the driver's seat and
threatened to kill her. Williams raped the girl twice during the ordeal. He
was arrested the following day and told a deputy sheriff that he had
mistaken the victim's car for his brother's car and fell asleep in the back
seat. During the trial, the State offered in its case in chief testimony of
two witnesses concerning an incident that took place approximately six
weeks before the instant offense. A 16-year-old similar fact witness
testified to having been parked in the same parking lot, and at the same
hour as the victim. She testified that upon opening her car door, she saw
the head of a man on the floor in the back of her car and screamed. The
man ran away but was pursued and immediately apprehended. The man
was identified as Williams. In that instance, Williams testified at police
headquarters that he had mistaken the car of the similar fact witness for
his brother's car, and crawled in the back of it to take a nap.
23Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
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The defendant argued that the trial court's admission of similar
fact evidence was error in that such evidence was "totally irrelevant," and
created undue prejudice in the minds of the jury.2 4 The Supreme Court
upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence. In doing so, the Court
thoroughly expressed the rule both in terms of when such evidence is
admissible, and when it is not:
Our view of the proper rule simply is that relevant
evidence will not be excluded merely because it relates
to similar facts which point to the commission of a
separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy.
The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy ......
The Court further stated:
As we did in Talley v. State26 we emphasize that the
question of relevancy of this type of evidence should be
cautiously scrutinized before it is determined to be
admissible. Nonetheless, relevancy is the test. If found
to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad
character or propensity, then it should be admitted.27
The Court carefully stated the concept in a manner designed to preserve
the rule's "original precedent":
In view of our analysis of the precedents and for the
future guidance of the bench and bar, the rule which we
have applied in affirming this conviction simply is that
evidence of any facts relevant to a material fact in issue
except where the sole relevancy is character or
propensity of the accused is admissible unless precluded
by some specific exception or rule of exclusion. This
rule we hold applies to relevant similar fact evidence
illustrated by that in the case at bar even though it points
24Id. at
5

658.

Id. at 659, 660 (emphasis supplied).

26 36 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1948).
27 Williams, 110 So.2d at 662 (emphasis added).
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to the commission of another crime. The matter of
relevancy should be carefully and cautiously considered
by the trial judge. However, when found relevantwithin
the limits of the stated rule, such evidence should be
permitted to go to the jury..
The Court did not reach its ruling with a sympathetic eye toward
concerns over the prejudicial effect of "similar fact evidence."
With regard to similar fact evidence, illustrated by that in
the case at bar, those who would exclude it invoke the
principles of undue prejudice, collateral issues and
immateriality. In so doing it appears to us that they
disregard the basic principle of the admissibility of all
relevant evidence2 9 having probative value in establishing
a material issue.
D. The Williams Rule Codified
The rule announced in Williams was later codified.3 ° Under the
rule as codified, evidence of collateral crimes is admissible if it is
relevant to a material fact in issue and is not solely probative of the
defendant's bad character or propensity"' "Similarity" or "uniqueness"

28Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
29Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
3' The drafters of the statute

were careful to use language that would
demonstrate to Florida courts a clear intention to codify Williams. See EHRHARDT, supra
note 6, §404.09.
3"See Fla. Stat. ch. 90.404(2)(a) (1998). The statute states:
2) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the
evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
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is not a requirement for the admissibility of similar fact evidence.32
However, the factual similarity of the collateral crime is of particular
significance in certain instances when determining whether such evidence
is relevant to the issue for which it is being offered.33 For example, in
cases where identity is in issue, the lack of similarity or uniqueness
between the collateral crime evidence and the crime charged can render
such evidence irrelevant to the issue of identity if it does not sufficiently
34
point to the defendant as the perpetrator.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Williams, 110 So.2d 654; Williams v. State of Florida, 621
So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1993); Finney v. State of Florida, 660 So.2d 674 at 682 (Fla. 1995)
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 404.09.
32Williams, 621 So.2d at 414; Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); EHRHARDT, supra note 6, §404.09.
33See Williams, 621 So.2d at 414. "Although similarity is not a requirement for
admission of other crime evidence, when the fact to be proven is, for example, identity or
common plan or scheme it is generally the similarity between the charged offense and the
other crime or act that gives the evidence probative value." Id. See also Bryan, 533 So.2d
at746. "The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to the charged crime
is based on the requirement to show relevancy. This does not bar the introduction of
evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the evidence
of other crimes is relevant." Id. See also EHRHARDT, supra note 6, §404.09.
" To this end, in Drake v. State - where the defendant was on trial for murder
and questions of identity became an issue - the Florida Supreme Court stated:
The material issue to be resolved by the similar facts evidence in
the present case is identity, which the State sought to prove by
showing Drake's mode of operating.
The mode of operating theory of proving identity is based on both
the similarity of and the unusual nature of the factual situations
being compared. A mere general similarity will not render the
similar facts legally relevant to show identity. There must be
identifiable points of similarity which pervade the compared factual
situations. Given sufficient similarity, in order for the similar facts
to be relevant the points of similarity must have some special
character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant.
See Drake v. State of Florida, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981) (reversing a murder
conviction based on "the erroneous admission of ... similar facts evidence"). This rule has
continued to be cited favorably by Florida courts. E.g., Thompson v. State of Florida, 494
So.2d 203, 204 (1986) (holding that the "details between two murders were not sufficiently
similar to be relevant and that [the] decisions in ... Drake control.").
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Professor Charles Ehrhardt describes the approach to
determining the relevance of collateral crime evidence as follows: "If the
fact or issue which the evidence is offered to prove is material or of
consequence to the action, the relationship between the collateral
evidence and material fact being proved must be examined to determine
whether the proffered evidence has a logical tendency to prove the
material fact. If that logical relationship exists, the evidence is
relevant."35
II. THE DETERIORATION OF COLLATERAL CRIME EVIDENCE IN CASES OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

A. A Shift in Focus Toward Strict Similarity
The genesis of the degeneration of admissibility of collateral
crime evidence in cases of child sexual abuse wasHeuring v. State of
3 6 While it may have been initially
Florida.
conceived of as a "new"
3
7
theory of admissibility to supplement § 90.404(2)(a) and expand
admissibility of similar fact evidence in cases of child sexual abuse, it has
instead decayed into a standard that is a significant departure from
Williams.
In Heuring,the defendant was convicted of sexual battery of his
stepdaughter while she was between the ages of seven and twelve. At
trial, the court allowed the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's
prior sexual battery of his natural daughter when she was between the
ages of seven and fifteen, which had occurred approximately twenty
years earlier. Excluded at trial was direct evidence of the defendant's
prior molestation of five other children.
In addressing the admissibility of the defendant's prior sexual
battery against his natural daughter, Justice Shaw, writing for the Court,
wrote:
3 EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 404.09.
36513 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1987).

3' EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 404.18.
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To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, the
similar fact evidence must meet a strict standard of
relevance. The charged and collateral offenses must be
not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some
unique characteristic or combination of characteristics
which sets them apart from other offenses.38

The above quotation is significant in that it merges a "strict
standard of relevance" with facts having "striking similarity" and
discusses the two as if they are mutually inclusive. Up until this time, the
degree to which collateral crime evidence consisted of "strikingly
similar" facts normally only entered the analysis when determining its
relevancy in cases where identity was in issue. 9 Even more significantly,
the Court then relied solely on cases where identity was in issue,4" as
authority, or possibly justification, for a requirement of "striking
similarity" in cases involving child sexual abuse. The Court did not
mention previous Florida cases where the Williams rule was applied to
cases of child sexual abuse.4
The excerpt below is from Heuring, and is taken from a
California case. It clearly shows the Supreme Court's reliance on cases
where identity is in issue as its basis for the requirement of striking
similarity:
Thus it may be said that the inference of identity arises
when the marks common to the charged and uncharged
offenses, considered singly or in combination, logically
operate to set the charged and uncharged offenses apart
from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so
38Heuring, 513

So.2d at 124.

" See Williams v. State of Florida, 621 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1993); Bryan v.
State of Florida, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989);
Thompson v. State of Florida, 494 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1986);
4' Thompson, 494 So.2d 203; Drake v. State of Florida, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.
1981).
4 See Cotita v. State of Florida, 381 So.2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev.
den., 392 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1981); Gibbs v. State of Florida 394 So.2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), aff'd, 406 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1981).
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doing, tend to suggest that the perpetrator of the
uncharged offenses was the perpetratorof the charged
offenses.4
Despite the Court's preoccupation with identification cases
where similarity of fact is relevant to concerns of misidentification of a
defendant - the Court noted that in cases such as the one before it,
identity is not the issue, rather the credibility of the victim is the "focal
issue." 43 The Court also stated:
We find that the better approach treats similar fact
evidence as simply relevant to corroborate the victim's
testimony, and recognizes that in such cases" the
evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect. 5
Ultimately, the Court held that there was no error in admitting the
testimony of Heuring's natural daughter concerning his previous sexual
batteries against her. Notwithstanding the Court's announced "better
approach" finding such evidence relevant to corroborate the victim's
testimony,4 6 the Court found the trial court's exclusion of direct evidence

of the defendant's prior sexual molestation of five other children proper,
not because they were not relevant, but simply because they were not

4

Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124 (citing People v. Haston, 69 Cal.2d 233 (1968))

(emphasis added).
41 Id. at 124.
44 This was apparently a reference to the familial context within which the
offense in Heuring took place. This reference to "such cases," however, could also have
been construed as a reference to all cases of child sexual abuse where identity is not in issue
because the victim knows the perpetrator, of which child sex crimes occurring within the
familial context are a subset. Later, however, the existence of a "familial relationship" would
develop into a factor that gained significance with the Supreme Court.
" Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124, 125 (emphasis added).
46 This was not the first time a court recognized the admission of Williams rule
evidence for the purpose of corroborating a victim's testimony. See Pendleton v. State of
Florida, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (affirming a sexual battery conviction and
ruling that testimony of two other women sexually attacked by the defendant was properly
admitted to corroborate the victim's testimony).
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"sufficiently similar. '47
For the first time, "striking similarity"was added as an essential
element for the admissibility of Williams rule evidence in cases of child
sexual abuse.48 In addition, the misperception that "striking similarity"
was needed as a safeguard to avoid "wrongful conviction" in cases of
child sexual abuse (where identity is not in issue) had begun. At first
glance, Heuring's added requirement of striking similarity only applied
when the collateral crime evidence was offered to corroborate the
victim's testimony in cases of child sexual abuse occurring within the
familial context. The prospective effectHeuring would have on cases of
child sexual abuse occurring outside the familial context was unknown.
In any event, the grounds for admitting similar fact evidence as relevant
to other material facts in issue, appeared to have been left undisturbed. 9
Before Heuring,"corroboration of the victim's testimony" could
have been construed as a proper basis to admit similar fact evidence in
cases of child sexual abuse, under the existing application of Williams.
Admissibility could have been based on a finding that the evidence was
relevant to the victim's credibility, and therefore notsolely relevant to
show the defendant's propensity.
To illustrate how much of a departure Heuring was from the
established rule of the time, consider the case ofCotita v. State. ° In
Cotita,the defendant was convicted of committing a lewd and lascivious
act upon his five-year-old daughter. Collateral crime evidence was
introduced at trial consisting of testimony regarding prior lewd acts
committed by the defendant upon the victim, and testimony of prior lewd
acts that he committed upon two other young girls in the same
neighborhood. The defendant raised an alibi defense and claimed that the
47 The conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the
court found the subsequent impeachment of the defendant on those five prior molestations
improper. Heuring, 513 So.2d at 125.
48 Following this excerpt, the Court continued: "In addition to the above
requirements, the evidence must be relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, intent,
motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident." Id. at 124.
49
See Calloway v. State of Florida, 520 So.2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988),
rev. den. 529 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1988).
50 381 So.2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev. den. 392 So.2d 1373 (Fla.
1981).
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five-year-old was fabricating the allegations.51 The defense objected to
the introduction of similar fact evidence, claiming it was solely relevant
to prove the defendant's bad character or propensity.
The First District Court of Appeals, applying the Williams
rationale, as well as its rule, held the admission of the similar fact
evidence was proper. While the Court did take note of the close
similarity of victims, locale, sex act, and a similar parental or custodial
relationship between the accused and the victims, it certainly did not
imply a per se requirement of strict similarity for admissibility.5 2 These
factors were simply pertinent to the Court's determination of relevancy
of these other acts to the case before it. The evidence was found to be
relevant to the alibi defense and to establishing a "pattern of
criminality."53 The Court gave an exhaustive historical overview of the
cases establishing the precedent for admitting Williams rule evidence in
cases of child sexual abuse.54 Suffice it to say that these cases involved
both evidence of prior sexual abuse committed against the same victi 5 5,
and evidence of prior sexual abuse committed against other victims.56
The Court in Cotita reiterated the rejection of an approach to
analyzing admissibility of similar fact evidence in terms of exceptions to
a general rule of exclusion, 57 rather than in terms of a broad rule of
admissibility.58 "Florida under the Williams Case follows the original
and better reasoned rule, which makes no special exception for any type
of crime. The familiar categories stated as the basis of admissibility of
similar fact evidence 'are given by way of example and not by way of
limitation'.""
While Heuringhas been perceived as establishing a new basis for
5'Id. at 1147.
2

1d. at 1148.
Id. at 1147.
4 Id. at 1147-49.
"Id. at n.16.
56Cotita, 381 So.2d 1146, at n.17.
" The "spurious rule" approach is discussed in footnotes 12-21 and
accompanying text.
" The "original rule" approach is discussed in footnotes 12-21 and
accompanying text.
59Cotita, 381 So.2d at 1149.
53
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allowing the use of similar fact evidence (i.e., to corroborate the victim's
testimony) in cases of child sexual abuse committed within the familial
context, it has subsequently been viewed as prohibiting the use of such
evidence, for purposes of victim corroboration, in other cases.6 °
B. A Solidified Emphasis on FamilialRelationships
The next case in which the issue was raised before the Supreme
Court was State v. Rawls.6 In Rawls, the defendant was convicted of
sexual battery of a nine-year-old boy. At trial, evidence was admitted
showing the defendant's previous strikingly similar sexual batteries of
three other young boys approximately the same age as the victim. The
trial judge, relying on Heuring, admitted the evidence as relevant to
corroborate the victim's testimony.
On appeal to the district court, it was ruled that the similar fact
evidence was admissible against the defendant because it satisfied the
Heuring test. First, the Court found that the collateral offenses were
"strikingly similar and shared some unique characteristic... " Second,
it found the evidence relevant to prove opportunity, plan, or absence of
mistake.63 Although properly admitted, the trial judge had instructed the
jury that such evidence could be considered by the jury to "corroborate
the testimony of the victim." The appellate court ruled:
Because there was no evidence in the case below that the
charged offense arose within a familial or custodial
setting, the instruction was an incorrect statement of law,
because section 90.404(2)(a) does not list victim
corroboration as a proper purpose for similar fact
evidence, and Heuring only authorizes use for
6 See Rawls v. State of Florida, 624 So.2d 757, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

See also Leverette v. State of Florida, 696 So.2d 519, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). "[W]e
agree with the appellant that the state was using this 14 year old crime to corroborate the
victim's testimony - something which is permitted as to child sexual battery in thefamilial
context, but not in this context." Id. (emphasis added)
61649 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1994).
62 Rawls v. State of Florida, 624 So.2d 757, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
63 Id. at 760.
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corroboration in a familial or custodial situation. The
effect of this erroneous instruction was to inform the jury
that similar-fact evidence was admissiblefor the purpose
of vouching for the credibility of the victim's testimony;
a result clearly contrary to established case law.64

The view of the district court of appeal that similar fact evidence was
admissible only for those purposes expressly listed in section
90.404(2)(a) is probably one of the clearest examples of the "spurious
rule" philosophy at work. It is directly contrary to the "original
precedents" embraced by the Court in Williams. It is also inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the prefatory language of section 90.404(2)(a):
"Similar fact evidence... is admissible when relevant to prove a material
fact in issue such as proof of motive, opportunity .

. . ."

(Emphasis

added). Clearly, these purposes are listed as examples and are not
65
intended as restrictions.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the
trial court improperly admitted the similar fact evidence, on the grounds
that no familial relationship existed between him and the victim. In
response, the Court identified factors to be used in determining the
existence of a "familial relationship" on a case-by-case basis, stating:
Consanguinity and affinity are strong indicia of a familial
relationship but are not necessary. Also, the defendant
and victim need not reside in the same home. The
relationship must be one in which there is a recognizable
"Id. The cases cited by the court were: Tingle v. State of Florida, 536 So.2d
202, 205 (Fla.1988); Turtle v. State of Florida, 600 So.2d 1214, 1221-1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); Page v. Zordan, 564 So.2d 500, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); and Fuller v.
State of Florida, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). These cases dealt with the
use of expert witnesses and hearsay to vouch for the credibility of the victim. They were not
decided on grounds that the use of similar fact evidence to corroborate a victim's testimony
was in any way improper.
6 See Williams v. State of Florida, 110 So.2d 654, 659 (Fla. 1959); Cotita, 381
So.2d at 1149; McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 447(1972). "[T]he range of relevancy
outside the ban is almost infinite." Id. See also EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 404.9 at 172.
"Section 90.404(2)(a) lists proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident as illustrative of some of the issues
to which the evidence of collateral occurrences may be relevant." Id.
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bond of trust with the defendant, similar to the bond that
develops between a child and her grandfather, uncle, or
guardian. Where an individual legitimately exercises
parental-type authority over a child or maintains custody
of a child on a regular basis, a familial relationship may
exist for purposes of the admissibility of collateralcrimes
evidence under Heuring.66

In the Rawls case, the collateral crime evidence consisted of
strikingly similar facts, the major distinction being that the defendant had
not yet established a "familial relationship" with his victim before
sexually molesting him. The Supreme Court then found the evidence
properly admissible to corroborate the testimony of the victim, stating:
"Even though Rawls was not in a familial relationship with [the victim]
identity was never an issue in the case. However, credibility of [the
victim] was very much an issue, and the similar fact evidence was
properly admitted to corroborate his testimony., 67 The Supreme Court
recognized that the rationale of Heuring could be applied in other cases
of child sexual68 abuse where identity is not in issue, but the credibility of
the victim is.
The significance of the Rawls case is that while it did recognize
that corroboration of a victim's testimony is a proper basis to admit
Williams rule evidence in cases of child sexual abuse occurringoutside
a familial relationship, it left the requirement of striking similarity intact
even when identity is not in dispute.
C. Strict Standardsfor Cases of Child Sexual Abuse
In 1995, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in Saffor v.
State.69 In Saffor, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery of his
girlfriend's ten-year-old son. Saffor was living in the same home as the
victim at the time of the offense, and had fathered two other children with
- Rawls, 624 So.2d at 1353.
Id. at 1354.

67
68

Id.

69 660 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1995).
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the victim's mother. Saffor and the victim were sleeping in the same bed
when Saffor pulled down the victim's pants andsodomized him. Similar
fact evidence was introduced regarding a prior conviction of attempted
lewd assault on Saffor's twelve-year-old niece that occurred four years
earlier. The incident place took when she spent the night at "her aunt's
house" (presumably Saffor's home too). Saffor entered her room while
she was sleeping, put his hand down her pajamas and started rubbing her
vagina. Saffor withdrew his hand when she told him to leave. The First
District Court of Appeal found that the evidence was sufficiently similar,
and upheld the admission of the evidence.7° The question of the proper
standard to be used in determining the admissibility of collateral crime
evidence in cases involving child sexual abuse within the familial context
was certified to the Supreme Court as follows:
What is the correct standard to be utilized in determining
the admissibility of collateral crimes evidence in cases
involving sexual battery within the familial context? 7'
Significantly, the certified question inquired into the proper standard to
admit collateral crime evidence in these cases generally. It was not
directed at identifying the proper standard when such evidence was
offered for the specific purpose of corroborating the victim's testimony.
The Supreme Court answered the certified question holding:
We hold instead that when the collateral sex crime and
the charged offense both occur in the familial context,
this constitutes a significant similarity for purposes of the
Williams rule, but that these facts, standing alone, are
insufficient to authorize admission of the collateralsex
crime evidence. There must be some additional showing
of similarity in order for the collateral sex crime
evidence to be admissible. The additional showing of
similarity will vary depending on the facts of the case
and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
we do not eliminate the requirement ofsimilarity which
70

Saffor v. State of Florida, 625 So.2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

7"Saffor, 660 So.2d at 669.
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undergirds the Williams rule. However, the strict
similarity in the nature of the offenses and the

circumstances surrounding their commission which
would be requiredin cases occurring outside the familial

context is relaxed by virtue of the evidence proving that
both crimes were committed in the familial context.72
Saffor therefore established two standards for the requirement of
similarity. One standard requires strict similarity for child sex crimes
occurring outside the familial relationship. The other is a so-called
"relaxed" similarity standard that applies only when both the charged
offense and the collateral crime occur within the familial context.
Significantly, the Saffor holding did not limit the requirement of striking
similarity, in child sexual abuse cases, to only those instances where the
evidence is offered to corroborate the victim's testimony. As a result,
striking similarity (applying either one standard or the other, as
appropriate) had become a requirement for the admission of similar fact
7
evidence regardlessof the purposefor which it is being offered. 1
72Id. at 672 (emphasis added).

7 See Paul v. State of Florida, 660 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(reversing a conviction of lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault on a minor because of the
improper admission of similar fact testimony); Moore v. State of Florida, 659 So.2d 414
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a conviction of capital sexual battery of defendant's
granddaughter although the incidents were substantially similar and occurred in a familial
context because there were not sufficient additional similarities to satisfy the tests for
admissibility established by Heuring and Saffor); State v. Griffen, 694 So.2d 122 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (vacating a lower court decision granting a motion in limine to exclude
similar crimes evidence in a sexual battery case because there was a familial relationship and
striking similarity between the events); Gutierrez v. State of Florida, 705 So.2d 660 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing a conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor
because the collateral evidence was not sufficiently similar); Leverette v. State of Florida,
696 So.2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing a conviction of sexual battery of an adult
because the collateral crimes evidence was not sufficiently strikingly similar); Rowland v.
State of Florida, 680 So.2d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that Saffor made it clear
that more was required than just the familial relationship); Shipman v. State of Florida, 668
So.2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding "that when the collateral sex crime and the
charged offense both occur in the familial context, this constitutes a significant similarity for
purposes of the Williams rule, but that these facts, standing alone, are insufficient to
authorize admission of the collateral sex crime evidence. There must be some additional
showing of similarity .... "); Sheppard v. State of Florida, 659 So.2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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The Court vacated Saffor's conviction on the ground that the
crime charged and the collateral crime "bore little resemblance to each
other."74 The Court found that the similarities were not sufficient to
admit the evidence even under the "relaxed" standard. In both instances,
however, the child victims were in a familial relationship with the
defendant, both incidents took place while the victims were in bed
sleeping, one victim was ten years old and the other twelve, andSaffor
was attracted only to each child's lower bodily orifices.
There were some key considerations not discussed by the Court
in Saffor. These considerations included that this evidence was relevant
to matters in additionto corroboration of the victim's testimony, namely
to prove opportunity, intent, and motive, and that the evidence's
probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Further, the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue in the case. Great
weight was placed on facts such as that one victim was male and the
other female, that the victims were not exactly the same age, that the
offenses occurred at different locations and "different times of the day,"
and that they took place at "different time frames."75
The facts to which the Court attached decisive weight reflect a
departure from its previous recognition that cases of child sexual abuse
are frequently crimes of opportunity. Contrast the approach the Court
took in Saffor, with the following excerpt from Heuring:
As the [district] court noted, the opportunity to sexually
batter young children in the familial setting often occurs
only generationally. Heuring sexually battered the
young female members of his family when the

App. 1995) (upholding a conviction of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious conduct
because the collateral crimes evidence was strikingly similar and the events had occurred in
a familial context). Compare with Evans v. State of Florida, 693 So.2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that "in a case charging the accused with the physical abuse of a child,
here the state seeks to present evidence of prior physical abuse committed by the defendant
upon the same child for the purpose of proving intent and/or absence of mistake or accident,
there is no need for factual similarity between the charge offense and the prior abusive
conduct beyond the existence of physical abuse in all instances.").
74
Saffor, 660 So.2d at 672.
7 Id.
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opportunity arose. 76
In Saffor, Justice Shaw explains the Heuring rationale in his
partial concurrence as follows:
The collateral crime evidence was not introduced as a
"fingerprint" to identify a particular defendant, out of
innumerable possible defendants, as the perpetrator. Had
such been the case, the stringent "strikingly similar"
standard would be the proper criterion. Rather, the
evidence was introduced only to support Jason's primary
testimony. The logic is simple: If the collateral crime
shared sufficient features with Jason's independent
account of the present crime, the jury could reasonably
consider the collateral crime as one more factor tending
to show that ten-year-old Jason was not fabricating his
account of what occurred."
In Saffor, the majority opinion described Heuring's intended effect as
follows:
In essence, our holding in Heuring enlarged the list of
instances where similar fact evidence is admissible (i.e.,
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident)
to also include 'admission of similar fact evidence to
8
corroborate a familial sexual battery victim's testimony.
It is important to note that the view represented in the above quotation
reflects an approach to admitting collateral crime evidence that is
consistent with the "spurious rule" and wholly inconsistent with the
approach adopted by the Court in Williams. Under a true application of
Williams, all relevant facts, including similar 'fact evidence, are
admissible, except where solely relevant to show the defendant's

76 Heuring, 513

So.2d at 124.

"' Saffor, 660 So.2d at 673.
78 Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
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propensity or bad character. 79 Therefore, corroboration of the victim's
testimony was already within the scope of Williams.
Conversely, when one looks at this issue from the mind set of the
"spurious rule" - a view that proposes that the effect ofHeuring was
one that "enlarg[ed] the list of instances where similar fact evidence is
admissible" - it illustrates the distortion of the rule in terms of a broad
rule of exclusion with specific exceptions. Clearly, the Court has
substantially deviated from the "original rule" enunciated inWilliamsand
codified in section 90.404(2)(a). It has done so without overruling or
distinguishing Williams, and without any explanation as to why section
90.404(2)(a) should no longer be given effect in cases of child sexual
abuse.
III.

RESTORING RELEVANCE

A. Enforcing Strict Similarity at the Expense of Logical Relevance
The basis for the Court's perception that requiring "striking
similarity" serves to avoid "wrongful conviction," in cases where identity
is not in issue, remains unclear. The same can be said for the distinction
drawn between the existence of a familial relationship and a non-familial
relationship as somehow determinative of a need to require two standards
of strict similarity. Is there empirical data demonstrating a correlation
between striking similarity of fact, and the veracity of a child molester's
victim? Unfortunately, such distinctions and similarity requirements
have gone beyond well-intentioned notions of avoiding wrongful
convictions and have operated to avoid rightful convictions as well. In
Heuring it was recognized that:
Cases involving sexual battery committed within the
familial context present special problems. The victim
knows the perpetrator, e.g., a parent, and identity is not
" Such evidence would also not be admitted if precluded by a specific rule of
exclusion. See Williams v. State of Florida, 110 So.2d 654, 663 (Fla 1959).
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an issue. The victim is typically the sole eyewitness and
corroborative evidence is scant. Credibility becomes the
focal issue."0
The features identified above, however, are not confined to cases
occurring within a familial context. The fact is, a victim's credibility can
become the focal issue in any case of child sexual abuse where the
physical evidence is scant, the victim is the sole eye witness, and identity
is not in issue.
In cases where identity is in issue, it logically follows that in
order for collateral crime evidence to be relevant to identity, the facts
must be strikingly similar, because without such similarity of detail or
uniqueness, it would not be probative of the issue of identity. In such
instances, the possibility of misleading the jury, and the risk of wrongful
conviction, would be great. Requiring striking similarity would indeed
serve the purpose of avoiding wrongful conviction. However, in those
cases of child sexual abuse where identity is not in issue, requiring
striking similarity of facts before admitting collateral crime evidence
operates to exclude any such evidence that is not virtually identical to the
crime charged, despite its overwhelming logical relevance to issues such
as motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake!'
An example of such a case is Paulv. State of Florida8 2 In Paul,
the defendant was convicted on four counts of lewd assault on a child.
Two of the counts involved digital penetration of thevictim's vagina,
while the other counts involved lewd fondling. In addition to the details
of the incidents themselves, evidence was introduced that the defendant
80 Heuring
81 See

v. State of Florida, 513 So.2d 122, 124.
Paul v. State of Florida, 660 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Moore

v. State of Florida, 659 So.2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Griffen, 694 So.2d 122
(Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Gutierrez v. State of Florida, 705 So.2d 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Leverett v. State of Florida, 696 So.2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); But see Evans
v. State of Florida, 693 So.2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). For examples of cases were
the admission of similar fact evidence was affirmed, see Rowland v. State of Florida, 680
So.2d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Shipman v. State of Florida, 668 So.2d 313 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996); Sheppard v. State of Florida, 659 So.2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Graves v. State of Florida, 704 So.2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
82 Paul v. State of Florida, 660 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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first met the victim when she was in the third grade; that he paid attention
to her at school; that he gave her roses and a card on Valentines Day; and
that he bought her candy. The victim also testified that the defendant had
touched her "in a way she didn't like," kissed her on the lips, and rubbed
her stomach while she sat in his lap. Similar fact evidence was also
admitted concerning the defendant's involvement with another young
girl. The similar fact witness (P.B.) testified that she met the defendant,
who was a volunteer at her school, while she was in the fifth grade, and
that the defendant showed her a lot of attention. In addition, she testified
that he carried her books, hugged her "in front real tight," rubbed her
back, patted her on the buttocks, sent her flowers three times with cards,
and gave her $10 every three weeks. She further testified that her mother
complained to the school board after the defendant sent her roses on
Valentines Day. 3 On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal found
that the similar facts in this case "bore less resemblance" to the crime
charged than the evidence excluded in Heuring. The court ruled that
P.B.'s testimony was not relevant to show an alleged common plan,
scheme, or even a similar modus operandi. The case was reversed and
remanded for a new trial.84
Another example can be found in the capital sexual battery case
of Moore v. State of Florida,5 where the appellate court said of the
similar fact evidence before it:

"3Id. at 752.
84 Id.

" 659 So.2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The victim of the charged offense
was the defendant's granddaughter. She testified to the facts of the offense and to other
repeated incidents involving digital penetration of her vagina and the defendant's fondling
of her breasts. These occurred while she was alone with the defendant, at his home, when
she was between the ages of seven and eleven. The similar fact evidence came from the
defendant's two daughters, who testified to incidents occurring while they where children.
One of the daughters testified that the when she was between ages four and five, the
defendant fondled her breasts and asked her to touch his penis. The other daughter testified
to incidents occurring while she was between the ages of nine and twelve. These incidents
included the defendant fondling her breasts. She also testified to being alone with the
defendant at home when he laid on top of her in bed and remembering that her vagina hurt
(she could not recall what caused her vagina to hurt). She further testified that when she
twelve, the defendant "kissed her like an adult," and masturbated in her presence. Id.
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Although the four incidents described in this evidence
share a significant similarity with the charged offense in
that all incidents occurred in a familial context, there are
insufficient additional similarities to satisfy the tests for
admissibility established in Heuring v. State, Feller v.
State, and Saffor v. State. 86
In fact, at least for some courts,Heuringand its progeny have effectively
supplanted section 90.404(2)(a) in cases involving child sexual abuse.87
If the courts are correct to exclude similar fact evidence that is relevant
to a material fact in issue, other than the defendant's propensity, based
solely on a failure to satisfySaffor's similarity requirements, then cases
of child sexual abuse are the only cases where the Williams rule, as
codified in section 90.404(2)(a), does not apply.
If, on the other hand, relevancy is still the test, then the fallacy
that striking similarity as determined by familial relationships somehow
serves to avoid "wrongful conviction" in cases where identity is not in
issue should be dispelled. Evidence of prior sexual misconduct does not
lose its logical relevance simply because it is not "strikingly similar."
Fact patterns of sex crimes committed against children will vary
depending on the circumstances, and whether the offender is a
"situational child molester" or a "preferential child molester." 8
"Situational Child Molesters" commit sex crimes against children
for a variety of reasons.89 They do not have a "true preference" for
children as sex objects.9 ° "Preferential child molesters" have a clear
sexual preference for children 9' Most child molesters have particular age
and gender preferences for their victims. However, age preferences for
86

1d. at 414.

" Chapter 90.404(2)(a) is not cited at all in the opinions of some of these cases.
See generally Paul v. State of Florida, 660 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Graves v.
State of Florida, 704 So.2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Sheppard v. State of Florida, 659
So.2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
88 LANNING, supra note 1, at 5.
'9Id. at5.
90 Id.

9'Id. at 6.
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different offenders can vary.92 While one child molester will prefer
children between ages six and eight, another will prefer children between
ages five and eleven. Some child molesters will molest boys or girls
indiscriminately 3 A study of 561 sex offenders revealed that pedophiles
that targeted young boys outside the home averaged approximately 281
sex acts with more than 150 victims. In contrast, those offenders who
targeted girls
within the family averaged more than 81 sex acts with 1.8
4'
victims.

9

Looking at the matter in terms of relevance and in the context of
cases other than cases of child sexual abuse provides a useful analogy.
An example could be made of a first-degree murder case where the
defendant asserts self-defense based on a claim that the victim tried to
strike the defendant with a metal pipe prior to the defendant fatally
shooting the victim. The issue in this example requires an analysis based
on relevance and the purpose of such evidence would be to corroborate
the defendant's testimony. Assume that the evidence of the victim's
prior violent tendencies toward the defendant consisted of a prior
occasion where the victim struck the defendant with a baseball bat, and
another occasion where the victim struck him with a bar stool. In such
a case, could anyone reasonably suggest that the evidence of the victim's
prior acts of violence toward the defendant were not relevant simply
because the prior attacks involved different objects, or because they
occurred at different locations or at different times of day, or because
there was no familial relationship between the defendant and the victinrl
Yet these are the same kinds of rationales thathave been relied on to
exclude a child molester's prior sex crimes in cases of child sexual abuse.
If similar fact evidence is otherwise admissibleunder section
90.404(2)(a), there is no reason for the lack of virtually identical facts to
require the exclusion of evidence that is overwhelmingly logically
relevant, and otherwise properly admissible.95 A standard that demands
92

1d. at 18.

93id.

94G. Abel, et al., Multiple ParaphilicDiagnoses Among Sex Offenders, 16
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY& L., 153-68 (1988).
9' Assuming it is not subject to preclusion by a specific rule of exclusion or by
§ 90.403.
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similarity for its own sake is precisely the type of standard thatWilliams
sought to avoid. "The objectionablefeature of this approach is that
seemingly the fundamental principle of logical relevancy is
abandoned. "96
B. An "Extremely Unwieldy" Standard
The practical result of theSaffor standard has been confusion in
the courts. The First District Court of Appeals made the following
comment regarding the Saffor standard:
The standard that has been crafted is unfortunately
extremely unwieldy to apply. Our trial judges are being
called upon on a case by case basis to determine whether
certain alleged sex acts performed by an adult upon one
child are sufficiently similar to other sex acts allegedly
performed upon another child to meet the standard of
admissibility. Hardly an enviable task.9 7
Some courts have resorted to using charts to identify the similarities and
differences between the facts of the charged offense and the facts of the
collateral crimes. 98 Courts will probably continue to have difficulty
trying to apply Saffor's similarity requirements because of the "lack of
clarity underlying its reasoning." 99

IV. FORMULATING A "BETTER REASONED RULE"

A. Reviving "OriginalPrecedents"
Overruling Saffor and returning the admission of similar fact
96 Williams v. State of Florida, 110 So.2d 654, 659.

" Rowland v. State of Florida, 680 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
9' See Moore v. State of Florida, 659 So.2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Shipman v. State of Florida, 668 So.2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
99 EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 404.18 at 192.
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evidence in cases of child sexual abuse back to the control of section
90.404(2)(a), would be a way for the Supreme Court to eliminate the
current onerous standard of admissibility that currently applies to these
cases. Given the fact, however, that the spurious rule is emerging as an
approach to admitting similar fact evidence in Florida, such a narrow
ruling would probably not be sufficient to ensure continued consistency
in future applications of the rule throughout the state. The "better
reasoned rule""1 ' would be to further reiterate the Williams rationale, and
"revive" the approach of the original rule. Articulating the rule in terms
of a broad rule of admissibilitywill sharpen the focus of a court applying
the rule to determine the relevance of the similar fact evidence, and
whether such evidence is solely probative of the defendant's
propensity.' 0 '
Further, a persistent view that similar fact evidence is only
admissible for those purposes specifically listed in section 90.404(2)(a),
unless a court "expands" the list, is tantamount to a reaffirmation of the
spurious rule, i.e., the broad rule of exclusion."0 2 A spurious rule
approach would facilitate inconsistency and disagreement on what is
within the exception to the general rule of exclusion."0 3 The Supreme
Court, however, can only revisit the issue on a case-by-case basis within
the confines of the facts of each case. A Legislative solution, on the
other hand, could address the issue with a broader perspective toward a
goal of uniform state application.
B. A Legislative Return to a Williams Rule Approach
One approach to removing the current constraints on admitting
collateral crime evidence in cases of child sexual abuse is for the
Legislature to simply "overrule" the currentSaffor standard. This could
be accomplished by codifying a statement to the effect that in cases of
child sexual abuse -

where identity is not in issue - the lack of striking

factual similarity between the offense charged and the collateral crime
'o Cotita v. State of Florida,
0o See Stone, supra note 14,

381 So.2d 1146, 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
at 1004.
012See Saffor v. State of Florida, 660 So.2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1995).
03 See Stone, supra note 14, at 1006.
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shall not preclude the admission of evidence which otherwise satisfies the
requirements of section 90.404(2)(a). Such a change would simply
remove the current impediments to admissibility of collateral crime
evidence in cases of child sexual abuse, and subject these cases to the
same standard of admissibility that applies to all other offenses.
In addition, in order to preserve the original intent of Williams,
section 90.404(2)(a) could be reworded in a manner that clearly indicates
that collateral crime evidence admissible under this section is not limited
to those issues specifically listed in paragraph (2)(a). The following is an
example of such language:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issueincluding,
but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the
evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or
propensity.
The effect of this additional change would be to reduce or eliminate the
tendency of some courts to determine admissibility of collateral crime
evidence in a manner consistent with the "spurious rule," and facilitate
an analysis of admissibility in accordance with the "original rule." This
modification would be applicable in all types of criminal cases.
C. ExpandingAdmissibility
Another approach to resolving the problem would be to take the
issue of admitting similar fact evidence in cases of child sexual abuse one
step farther. In addition to removing the current constraints on
admissibility, the Legislature could provide for such evidence to also be
admissible for the purpose of proving the defendant's propensity to
commit child sex crimes. InState v. Rush °4 the Second District Court of
Appeals encouraged the Legislature to make such a change:

04399 So.2d 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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We . . . would suggest that it is now time for the
legislature to clear the air and recognize that a change in
the rule of admissibility of similar fact evidence in child
sexual molestation cases is warranted and badly needed.
As alluded to before, we believe that it is likely that
there are available statistics to show that those who
commit child sex offenses have a propensity to commit
that peculiar type of offense, that it is inherent in the
nature of the crime itself, and being so inherent
the
05
propensity itself becomes a relevant factor.
They reiterated this view in Barnes v. State of Florida,saying:
We again take this opportunity, as we did in State v.
Rush, to call upon the Legislature of Florida to consider
a change in "Williams Rule" evidence as codified in
section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1984), as it pertains
to child sexual molestation cases. We feel it advisable to
consider whether all evidence of other deviate sexual
behavior should be admissible in such cases because
it
06
may show propensity to commit such crimes.
A change in the law to expand the admission of collateral crime
evidence in cases of child sexual abuse would be a Legislative
recognition of the inherent and secretive nature of these crimes. It is a
recognition that has been made by Congress0 7 and by other states'
Legislatures.0 8 For example, in response to a challenge made against a
"05Id. at

529.
477 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
107See FED. R. EviD. 414 (Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation
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Cases); FED. R. EVID. 415 (Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual
Assault or Child Molestation); see also FED. R. EviD. 413 (Evidence of Similar Crimes in
Sexual Assault Cases).
0" California, Texas, Missouri, and Colorado are examples of other states that
have provisions which specifically address the admission of similar fact evidence in cases
of child sexual abuse or sexual abuse cases in general. Under the California, Texas, and
Missouri provisions, similar fact evidence is admissible to prove the defendant's propensity
to commit sex crimes against children. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1108 (Deering 1999); TEX.
CRtM P. CODE ANN. § 38.37 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT § 566.025 (1999). Colorado's
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appellate court said:

Our elected Legislature has determined that the policy
considerations favoring the exclusion of evidence of
uncharged sexual offenses are outweighed in criminal
sexual offense cases by the policy considerations
favoring the admissibility of such evidence. The
Legislature has determined the need for this evidence is
''critical" given the serious and secretive nature of sex
crimes and the often resulting credibility contest at
trial.''
On the federal level, evidence of collateral crimes can be
admitted for any relevant matter, including the defendant's propensity.
For criminal cases, the Federal Rules contain two specific provisions, one
rule pertaining to sex offenses and another pertaining to child
molestation. With regard to child molestation cases, Federal Rules of
Evidence 414(a) provides:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of
an offense of child molestation, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."'
Regarding cases of sexual assault, Federal Rules of Evidence 413(a)
provides:

provision, however, prohibits the use of similar fact evidence solely to prove the defendant's
propensity. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-301 (1998).
109 CAL. Evin. CODE § i108.
Section 1108(a) provides: "In a criminal
prosecution in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by
§ 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to § 352." Section 1101 is California's
general provision regarding the admission of similar fact evidence. Section 352 is the
provision concerning balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect.
"' People v. Fitch, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
...
Fed. R. Evid. 414(a).
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(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for
its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." 2
Historically, the admission of collateral crime evidence when it
is solely relevant to show the defendant's propensity to commit crimes
has been prohibited." 3 Regardless of the approach taken, some will
argue that any expansion of the admissibility of similar fact evidence will
violate the "fundamental fairness" component of due process. 14 The
argument is essentiallythat the admission of such evidence would permit
a jury to convict the defendant as punishment for his other bad acts,
rather than for his charged crime. However, the federal courts in
challenges made to the federal rules have rejected such arguments!.5 In
addition, similar arguments have been raised in opposition to a
comparable California provision, and have been defeated." 6 Anyone
112Id.
"'

See Williams v. State of Florida, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). See also Stone,

supra note 14.
11 See, e.g., Lois M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to
Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process
Clause, 28 Loy. U. CHI.L.J. 1 (1996).
"' See United States. v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir.1996) (rejecting
appellant's claim that the lower court abused its discretion by letting in similar crimes
evidence); United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming a grant of
a motion in limine to suppress similar fact evidence in an adult sexual abuse, battery and
criminal sexual penetration case because considering the complex nature of the case,
admitting the evidence would lead to jury confusion); United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d
767 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing a grant of a motion in limine in a child sexual abuse case
where the District Court had granted the motion because of the danger of unfair prejudice,
the Eighth Circuit noted that this is a danger with all propensity evidence, but that is
insufficient reason to bar the evidence); United States v. Mound, 157 F.3d 1153 (8th Cir.
1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (urging a reconsideration of a denial of a petition for rehearing
because the issue of admitting similar crimes evidence "presents [a] great a risk that the jury
will convict a defendant for his past conduct or unsavory character' that it violates due
process.")
16 People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 753, 760. "Since Evidence Code section
1108 does not implicate any of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and it does not offend a
fundamental principle ofjustice rooted in traditions and conscience of our people, we find
that Evidence Code section 1108 on its face does not violate the Due Process Clause." Id.
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asserting a due process claim in order to exclude relevant evidence
carries a heavy burden." 7
V. CONCLUSION

For reasons which are unclear to this writer, striking similarity of
fact became an essential element for admitting similar fact evidence in
cases of child sexual abuse. This occurred in the face of the clearly
articulated rationale in Williams- to apply the rule of admitting similar
fact evidence in terms of a broad rule of admissibility, and with an
unambiguous pronouncement that "the test is relevancy."''18 The
codification of Williams in section 90.404(2)(a), was a legislative
endorsement of the Williams approach. The current standard under
Saffor can lead to the exclusion of unquestionably relevant, and
absolutely essential evidence for no other reason than that the facts are
not "strikingly similar." No other type of casehas been carved out of the
requirements of section 90.404(2) (a) and subjected to such stringent
standards for admissibility.
Every guilty child molester who has been acquitted as result of
the inability to use similar fact evidence under the current standard,
which should have been admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), has been
freed to molest again. Many of them have molested again most of those
-

more than once, and some of those -

hundreds more times. It is

better to let a guilty person go free than to convict an innocent man or
woman. However, the policy considerations concerning what safeguards
are needed to avoid "wrongful conviction," which safeguards actually
work toward that end, and which ones risk too many innocent lives; are
matters which demand careful Legislative scrutiny.

See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (holding the due process clause
does not guarantee the right to introduce any and all evidence). See also Dowling v. U.S.,
493 U.S. 342, 352 (ruling that the admission of relevant evidence concerning the
commission of a crime of which the defendant had been acquitted did not violate due
process.)
..Williams v. State of Florida, 110 So.2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1959).
"7

